Chicago and Its Discontents
Timothy J. Muris† & Jonathan E. Nuechterlein††
This symposium began with a call for papers “reassessing the validity of the
Chicago School’s assumptions about competition and considering whether a more
aggressive approach to antitrust enforcement is now warranted.” That framing uncritically accepts the premises of antitrust’s new populist movement: first, that “the
Chicago School” marked an abrupt break from prior academic analysis of antitrust
law, and second, that its adherents shared a common positive agenda fundamentally at odds with robust antitrust enforcement. Both of those premises are false. The
Chicago School represented a logical continuation of the antitrust analysis developed over the preceding decades, and its members shared no positive doctrinal
agenda. Instead, they shared a commitment only to promoting consumer interests
by means of rigorous economics. Of course, that commitment influenced how the
economics profession and antitrust policymakers thought, and progressive “postChicago” scholarship today shares the same commitment to consumer welfare and
economic rigor. Such scholarship thus has far more in common with Chicago School
scholarship of the 1960s and 1970s than with today’s populist movement, which
abandons any coherent framework altogether.

INTRODUCTION
Antitrust populists rally around two basic themes: big is bad,
and “the Chicago School” is to blame for letting big companies do
bad things. Here is how Barry Lynn of the Open Markets Institute describes the influence of that “School”:
A generation ago, when a small crew within the Reagan administration set out to clear the way for a radical reconcentration of power, they did so not by openly assailing our antimonopoly laws but by altering the intellectual frames that
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guide how we enforce them. . . . [T]he new goal was “efficiency.” Rather than protect the “opportunity” of the citizen
producer, the new goal was to promote the “welfare” of the
“consumer.” 1
The result? An “overthrow of our antimonopoly laws,” leading
America to become “an economic—hence political—autocracy.”2
Taking such rhetoric at face value, this symposium originated
with a call for papers “reassessing the validity of the Chicago
School’s assumptions about competition and consider[ing]
whether a more aggressive approach to antitrust enforcement is
now warranted.”3 Yet the very framing of that question is problematic because it uncritically accepts the populist movement’s
skewed historical narrative. As Lynn’s quote illustrates, that
movement assumes, first, that the Chicago School marked an abrupt shift from prior academic approaches to antitrust law, and
second, that its adherents shared a common positive agenda fundamentally at odds with robust antitrust enforcement. In fact,
both of those premises are false, and exposing them as such places
today’s populism in much-needed perspective.
Although the Chicago School of the 1960s and 1970s made
critical contributions to the field, it represented a logical continuation of, not a radical break from, the modes of antitrust analysis
developed by thoughtful scholars over the preceding decades. Consider some key principles that populists attribute to the Chicago
School and accordingly vilify—that antitrust should address only
“harm to competition” rather than mere “harm to competitors”;
that “harm to competition” means harm to consumer interests;
and that antitrust should thus narrowly circumscribe a large
firm’s liability for charging low prices, even if they drive smaller,
less efficient businesses from the market.

1
Barry C. Lynn, No Free Parking for Monopoly Players: Time to Revive Anti-Trust
Law (The Nation, June 8, 2011), archived at https://perma.cc/6QZ5-EMTB.
2
Id. See also Mark Glick, The Unsound Theory Behind the Consumer (and Total)
Welfare Goal in Antitrust, 63 Antitrust Bull 455, 456–58 (2018); Lina M. Khan, The Ideological Roots of America’s Market Power Problem, 127 Yale L J F 960, 965–70 (2018);
Marshall Steinbaum, Eric Harris Bernstein, and John Strum, Powerless: How Lax Antitrust and Concentrated Market Power Rig the Economy Against American Workers, Consumers, and Communities *16–17 (Roosevelt Institute, Feb 2018), archived at
https://perma.cc/38K7-Q4Y9; Marc Jarsulic, et al, Reviving Antitrust: Why Our Economy
Needs a Progressive Competition Policy *11–13 (Center for American Progress, June 2016),
archived at https://perma.cc/7FKN-MUJA.
3
Call for Papers: Symposium on Re-Assessing the Chicago School of Antitrust Law
(U Chi L Rev 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/6Q8D-RCX4.
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These hallmarks of the “consumer welfare” standard did not
originate at Chicago. They all appeared prominently in critiques
of the Robinson-Patman Act4 in the 1950s and 1960s by such nonChicago scholars as Frederick Rowe,5 Professor Morris Adelman,6
and Professor Robert Pitofsky.7 The same principles also appeared in two 1949 articles attacking the government’s successful
Sherman Act prosecution of the giant A&P supermarket chain for
decimating less efficient corner grocers through low prices and
vertical integration. Those articles—one by MIT’s Adelman8 and
the other by then–Yale Law student Donald Turner9—exposed
the economic incoherence of the government’s case and, in particular, its failure to show how harm to A&P’s smaller rivals could
possibly harm consumers. When Turner simultaneously identified the “potential contradiction” underlying the government’s antitrust philosophy—that is, its tendency to suppress welfareenhancing competition while purporting to promote it10—he foreshadowed Robert Bork’s claim almost thirty years later that antitrust policy had become “a policy at war with itself.”11 And the
Supreme Court’s Brooke Group Ltd v Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp12 predatory pricing standard,13 so widely condemned
by populists today, essentially follows a proposal set forth in a 1975
law review article that Turner coauthored with his Harvard colleague Professor Phillip Areeda after returning from a stint as DOJ
antitrust chief in an economically liberal Johnson Administration.14
4

Pub L No 74-692, 49 Stat 1526 (1936), codified as amended at 15 USC § 13.
See Frederick M. Rowe, The Evolution of the Robinson-Patman Act: A Twenty-Year
Perspective, 57 Colum L Rev 1059, 1060 (1957); Frederick M. Rowe, Price Discrimination,
Competition, and Confusion: Another Look at Robinson-Patman, 60 Yale L J 929, 940–42
(1951); Part II.A.
6
See M.A. Adelman, A&P: A Study in Price-Cost Behavior and Public Policy 160–
79 (Harvard 1959).
7
See Report of the American Bar Association Commission to Study the Federal
Trade Commission 67–68 (1969) (Robert Pitofsky, ABA Commission Counsel).
8
See generally Morris A. Adelman, The A&P Case: A Study in Applied Economic
Theory, 63 Q J Econ 238 (1949).
9
See generally Note, Trouble Begins in the “New” Sherman Act: The Perplexing
Story of the A&P Case, 58 Yale L J 969 (1949). See also Adelman, A&P at 18 & n 9 (cited
in note 6) (identifying Turner as the author of the Yale Note).
10 Note, 58 Yale L J at 969–71 (cited in note 9).
11 Robert H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself 7 (Basic
Books 1978).
12 509 US 209 (1993).
13 Id at 222–23.
14 See Phillip Areeda and Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices
Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 Harv L Rev 697, 715 (1975). See also notes 95–99
and accompanying text.
5
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Progressive “post-Chicago” scholarship today also has far
more in common with Chicago School scholarship of the 1960s
and 1970s than with today’s populist movement. To appreciate
this point, we must distinguish between two different types of antitrust criticism: (1) economically rigorous efforts to identify new
contexts in which aggressive antitrust intervention is needed to
promote consumer welfare and (2) populist movements to dispense with consumer welfare as the sole or even primary focus of
antitrust concern. Initiatives in the first category include “raising
rivals’ costs” theories of harm, developed by Professors Steven
Salop, Thomas Krattenmaker, and others starting in the 1980s.15
Such theories rest on rigorous economic foundations and retain
an appropriately sharp focus on consumer welfare. These proposals for increased antitrust intervention accordingly involve an
evolution of thinking associated with the Chicago School, not a
conceptual break from that thinking,16 just as Chicago itself represented an evolution of pre–Chicago School antitrust analysis.
In contrast, populist initiatives in the second category—that is, to
dispense with consumer welfare as the primary focus of antitrust—have no clear conceptual objectives other than reining in
large global companies that displace smaller, more local, and less
efficient companies. This movement does indeed reject the Chicago
School, but only in the same sense that it broadly rejects a more
general commitment to consumer interests.
These are important points for antitrust authorities, scholars, and practitioners to understand today. They should help defuse political rhetoric about the Chicago School label and identify
the true ideological fault line today’s debates: between those who
do and those who do not view consumer interests as paramount
in antitrust doctrine.
I. “CHICAGO SCHOOL”: AN EPITHET IN NEED OF HISTORICAL
CONTEXT
The term “Chicago School” is typically associated with antitrust literature written by scholars who either taught at or had
15 See Thomas G. Krattenmaker and Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion:
Raising Rivals’ Costs to Achieve Power over Price, 96 Yale L J 209, 253–55 (1986); note 124
and accompanying text (discussing the Chicago School antecedents of these theories).
16 Andrew I. Gavil, William E. Kovacic, and Jonathan B. Baker, Antitrust Law in
Perspective: Cases, Concepts, and Problems in Competition Policy 70 (Thomson/West 2d ed
2008) (“Post-Chicago commentators generally propose qualifying rather than supplanting
Chicago views.”).
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attended the University of Chicago from the mid-1950s through
the 1970s. These included Professors Aaron Director and Edward
Levi, who taught an enormously influential antitrust course there
beginning in the 1950s, and Richard Posner and Frank Easterbrook,
who began supplementing their teaching duties in the 1980s with
service on the Seventh Circuit, where they influenced antitrust
law more directly.17 Ironically, the figure most commonly associated today with the Chicago School, Robert Bork, never taught
there. But as a 1953 graduate of the Law School, he credited
Director and Levi, among others, for shaping the early development of his antitrust philosophy.18
The Chicago School has had an undeniably important influence on how courts, practitioners, and scholars have viewed antitrust law for the past half century. But popular accounts have
tended to misunderstand the nature of that influence. To dispel
the confusion, we must distinguish among three types of questions:
(1) What are the ultimate objectives of antitrust—the
promotion of consumer interests or some other
goal/goals?
(2) What is the correct mode of analysis for measuring
antitrust’s success in meeting those designated
objectives—economic/empirical analysis or something
else?

17 Richard A. Posner, Antitrust: Cases, Economic Notes and Other Materials xiii
(West 1st ed 1974). In 1974, Posner described his new antitrust casebook as

a successor to mimeographed materials first prepared by Edward H. Levi and
used by him and Aaron Director in the course on antitrust law that they taught
jointly at the University of Chicago Law School for many years. On the last class
of each week of the course, Professor Director would present an economist’s comments on the cases discussed during the week. The economics notes scattered
throughout this casebook attempt to do what Professor Director’s lectures did:
expound the relevant economic concepts against the background of particular
cases that illustrate the relevance of the concepts to the issues of antitrust law.
. . . Much of the economic analysis expounded in these notes is based on ideas
first proposed by Director. A number of these ideas were later developed and
published by other economists whose work I do cite. These citations conceal
Director’s seminal role in the development of the economics of competition and
monopoly presented in this book.
18

See Bork, Antitrust Paradox at ix–x (cited in note 11).
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(3) What substantive antitrust rules would best ensure that
antitrust serves its designated objectives?
When populist critics attack the Chicago School, they are
often (though not invariably) attacking what they perceive as
Chicago’s answer to the third question, concerning antitrust doctrine. Populists routinely assume that Chicago School focused on,
and favored “conservative” approaches to, the doctrinal content of
antitrust law. There is of course a kernel of truth in that assumption. Some individual Chicago School scholars did indeed advocate broad limits on market intervention. In addition to Bork,
these included Frank Easterbrook, who advocated a “profoundly
skeptical program” that would limit antitrust enforcement to “little other than prosecuting plain vanilla cartels and mergers to
monopoly.”19
It is also true that scholars associated with the Chicago
School challenged long-held but poorly tested assumptions supporting antitrust intervention in particular contexts. By the early
1970s, much of antitrust policy reflected the “simple market concentration doctrine,” which held that even modest degrees of market concentration were inherently harmful, even in seemingly
well-functioning markets.20 Economists, enforcement agencies,
and many in Congress had all invoked that doctrine to support
several aggressive forms of antitrust intervention, such as suits
to block mergers even in reasonably unconcentrated markets and
emerging initiatives to hold companies liable under novel § 2 theories of “no-fault monopoly” and “shared monopoly.”21 The research of Professor Harold Demsetz and others associated with
the Chicago School, commemorated in a 1974 volume of essays,
helped defuse this movement by refuting the empirical premises
of the simple market concentration doctrine.22 This Chicago
School–led scholarship ultimately led industrial organization
economists and antitrust authorities to take a more nuanced view

19

Frank Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust Policy, 84 Mich L Rev 1696, 1701 (1986).
See Bruce H. Kobayashi and Timothy J. Muris, Chicago, Post-Chicago, and Beyond: Time to Let Go of the 20th Century, 78 Antitrust L J 147, 167 (2012).
21 See generally Timothy J. Muris, Economics and Antitrust, 5 Geo Mason L Rev
303 (1997).
22 See Harold Demsetz, Two Systems of Belief About Monopoly, in Harvey J. Goldschmid,
H. Michael Mann, and J. Fred Weston, eds, Industrial Concentration: The New Learning
164, 170–74 (Little, Brown 1974).
20
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of market concentration in the modern economy, with critical implications both for merger-enforcement policy and for the novel
§ 2 theories of the 1970s.23
That said, populists are wrong to equate the Chicago School
in general with advocacy for conservative antitrust doctrine. As
one of us has written, the scholars associated with that School
had no single affirmative program for antitrust; they were unified
only in their rejection of the intellectual incoherence that had
characterized so many mid-century antitrust decisions.24 For example, while Frank Easterbrook proposed a rule of per se legality
for all price cuts by monopolists,25 Richard Posner not only rejected that position, but also criticized, as too permissive and prodefendant, the mainstream predatory pricing test advocated by
Harvard Professors Areeda and Turner.26 And Chicago School
scholars were all over the map on merger policy. Bork’s thenpermissive views came close to those of the Obama Justice Department decades later, whose 2010 guidelines effectively made
four-to-three mergers the marginal case.27 Posner advocated a
policy far more restrictive than the Obama DOJ’s; his approach
would presumptively bar any merger leaving a four-firm concentration level greater than 60 percent.28 And the Chicago School
23 The essays collected in Industrial Concentration: The New Learning summarized
discussions at a seminal March 1974 conference at Virginia’s Airlie House on the concentration issue. See Harvey J. Goldschmid, H. Michael Mann, and J. Fred Weston, eds, Industrial Concentration: The New Learning vii–viii (Little, Brown 1974). The conference
was formatted as a debate between proponents of the simple concentration school, then
constituting the vast majority, and its opponents, almost all associated with the Chicago
School. The effect on policy and doctrine was profound, especially in tempering hostility to
mergers, but also in undercutting the expansion of “no fault” and “shared monopoly” theories of Section 2 liability. The Chicago position succeeded not because it favored entrenched interests or big business, but because it rested on the types of sound economic
analysis that those on both sides of the debate favored. See Jonathan B. Baker, Book Review, Economics and Antitrust Policy, 34 Antitrust Bull 919, 920 (1989). See also note 117
(addressing today’s market-concentration controversies).
24 Kobayashi and Muris, 78 Antitrust L J at 167–68 (cited in note 20).
25 Frank H. Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U Chi L Rev
263, 333–37 (1981).
26 See Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Law: An Economic Perspective 191–93 (Chicago
1976) (criticizing Areeda and Turner).
27 Compare Bork, Antitrust Paradox, at 221–22 (cited in note 11) (advocating for an
interpretation that would make four-to-three mergers presumptively lawful but not threeto-two mergers), with Federal Trade Commission, Federal Trade Commission Workshop
on Horizontal Merger Guidelines Review Project *23–24 (Jan 26, 2010), archived at
https://perma.cc/WS2T-MJ5F (“The assumption there was sort of a six to five [merger] was
the threshold where we would start getting concerned, it looks more like where we are
today is five to four or four to three.”).
28 See Posner, Antitrust Law at 112 (cited in note 26).
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scholar with the greatest actual influence on merger policy—
Reagan DOJ antitrust chief William Baxter—endorsed an approach that is highly restrictive by today’s standards. His approach is reflected in the 1982 merger guidelines, which made sixto-five mergers the marginal case.29
In short, the animating spirit that unified the Chicago School
related less to the third question above—How interventionist
should antitrust doctrine be?—than to the first two: What is antitrust’s objective, and how should we measure success in meeting
it? The Chicago School’s answers to these questions are well
known. Chicago School scholars identified the interests of consumers as the paramount concern of antitrust and opposed “balancing” them against other, typically conflicting interests, such
as the desire of small businesses to avoid price competition from
larger, more efficient businesses.30 And Chicago School scholars
also chose rigorous economics as the preferred means of determining whether antitrust doctrine was actually serving consumer
welfare.31 As we next discuss, however, Chicago School scholars
did not invent these approaches to antitrust. Instead, their insights built on the earlier insights of others, stretching back to
the first half of the twentieth century, and coexisted with similar
insights by non-Chicago contemporaries.
II. CHICAGO’S PRIOR ART
If the Chicago School had sought to patent its use of the consumer welfare standard and rigorous economic analysis, it would
have confronted two formidable objections. The first, discussed
immediately below, would have been the “prior art”: scholars unassociated with the Chicago School had long advocated both the
primacy of consumer interests and economic analysis. And the
second objection, discussed in Part III below, would have been a
problem of “obviousness.” These non-Chicago scholars favored the
same approach as the Chicago School not by coincidence, but because mid-century antitrust precedents had made it obvious that
29 See United States Department of Justice Antitrust Division, Merger Guidelines,
47 Fed Reg 28493, 28497 (1982) (“Markets . . . having the equivalent of no more than approximately six equally sized firms [are considered to be highly concentrated]. Additional
concentration resulting from mergers is a matter of significant competitive concern.”).
30 See Bork, Antitrust Paradox at 89 (cited in note 11) (“[T]he case is overwhelming
for judicial adherence to the single goal of consumer welfare in the interpretation of the
antitrust laws.”).
31 See Kobayashi and Muris, 78 Antitrust L J at 152 (cited in note 24) (discussing
the Chicago School’s use of theoretical and empirical economics to analyze antitrust law).
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antitrust would remain an incoherent muddle until it refocused
on consumer welfare and economics.
A. Robinson-Patman Criticism: Adelman, Rowe, and Pitofsky
Much of the pre–Chicago School scholarship32 foreshadowing
the modern consumer welfare standard appeared in response to
the most important antitrust legislation of the interwar period:
the Robinson-Patman Act of 1936, whose lessons are too often forgotten in antitrust commentary today.33 The Act generally prohibits a supplier from selling “commodities of like grade and quality”
at different prices to different buyers, except that (among other
exceptions) the seller may offer special discounts to “meet” competition and may make “due allowance for differences in the cost
of manufacture, sale, or delivery.”34 A Yale Law professor presciently observed a year after passage that the Act’s prohibitions and
arcane exceptions would elevate “arbitrariness and guesswork”
over economic theory and that “[t]rial is to proceed by the ordeal
of cost accountancy.”35
More problematically, the Act was not only poorly written,
but poorly conceived. Originally entitled the “Wholesale Grocers
Protection Act,”36 it was explicitly enacted to protect entrenched
economic interests—wholesalers and small retailers—by keeping
large chain stores such as the supermarket giant A&P from underselling their smaller rivals by acquiring goods at a discount,
bypassing middlemen, and passing along the savings to consumers.37 As Chief Judge Diane Wood (a liberal member of the
Chicago Law faculty) explained for the Seventh Circuit in 2016,

32 Our use of the phrase “pre-Chicago” denotes the period before the modern Chicago
School’s scholarship became widely known in the 1960s. Of course, the University of Chicago
had important antitrust scholars before Professors Director and Levi, but they are not
typically associated with the modern Chicago School.
33 See Timothy J. Muris and Jonathan E. Nuechterlein, Antitrust in the Internet Era:
The Legacy of United States v. A&P, 54 Rev Indust Org 651, 666–67 (2019) (arguing that
the Act was a result of “antitrust [being] divorced from an economically rigorous focus on
consumer welfare” and that modern antitrust critics similarly fail to distinguish “between
harm to competitors and harm to competition”); Hugh C. Hansen, Robinson-Patman Law:
A Review and Analysis, 51 Fordham L Rev 1113, 1187–96 (1983) (discussing the harmful
effects of the Act, including increased costs of doing business, price rigidity, and price
fixing).
34 15 USC § 13(a), (b).
35 Walton H. Hamilton, Cost as a Standard for Price, 4 L & Contemp Probs 321, 323,
328 (1937).
36 Hansen, 51 Fordham L Rev at 1123 (quotation marks omitted) (cited in note 33).
37 See Muris and Nuechterlein, 54 Rev Indust Org at 656–58 (cited in note 33).
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the Robinson-Patman Act’s “‘fit with . . . antitrust policy is awkward, as it was principally designed to protect small businesses’
at the expense of consumers.”38
The preeminent mid-century expert on the Robinson-Patman
Act was Fred Rowe, who published the leading treatise on the
subject.39 In 1951, while still a law student, Rowe criticized the
Act in the Yale Law Journal for harming welfare-enhancing competition in the name of promoting individual competitors.40 As he
noted, other scholars had rightly characterized the Act as “a part
of the struggle between the older and newer organizations in distribution in which the older group sought protection from the
state presumably because it was not prepared to rely on the outcome of competition.”41 Rowe illustrated the point by quoting a
wholesaler lobbyist who complained to Congress that the federal
antitrust agencies had acted with insufficient “zeal and loyalty for
the Robinson-Patman Act” and had “seem[ed] to have gone off the
reservation to follow the will-o’-the wisp of something termed
‘hard competition.’” 42 Rowe observed that when the agencies applied the Act by its terms, as such rent-seekers demanded,
“[n]eeded development of lower-cost distribution is impaired.
Competitive public policy should not preserve wholesalers
against the inroads of competition.”43
Ultimately, Rowe concluded, the Robinson-Patman Act itself
was “antithetical to [sound] antitrust policy.”44 He explained: “To
cope with price discrimination as part of a coherent antitrust
program, law and economics must jibe. Robinson-Patman’s
demonstrated blindness to economic consequences blocks the
market analysis essential to this result.”45 Rowe also expressed
concern that the Act had corrupted antitrust analysis in general
and quoted others with the same view: “The philosophy of the
38 Id at 658, quoting Woodman’s Food Market, Inc v Clorox Co, 833 F3d 743, 746 (7th
Cir 2016), cert denied, 137 S Ct 1213 (2017).
39 See generally Frederick M. Rowe, Price Discrimination Under the RobinsonPatman Act (Little, Brown 1962).
40 See Rowe, 60 Yale L J at 942–55 (cited in note 5).
41 Id at 949 n 136, quoting Arthur R. Burns, The Effectiveness of the Federal Antitrust
Laws: A Symposium, 39 Am Econ Rev 689, 695 (1949).
42 Rowe, 60 Yale L J at 949 n 136 (cited in note 5), quoting Functional Operation of
the Federal Trade Commission, Hearings Before Select Committee on Small Business, 81st
Cong, 2d Sess 65–66 (1950) (statement of R.H. Rowe, United States Wholesale Grocers’
Association).
43 Rowe, 60 Yale L J at 948–49 (cited in note 5) (footnote omitted).
44 Id at 974.
45 Id at 974–75 (emphasis added).
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Sherman Act appears to be yielding to a policy of ‘ethical competition,’ which does not differentiate between the stability of the
individual firm and the stability of the total economy.”46 Quoting
a presidential economic advisor, he worried that this new populist
tendency, “by depriving competition of its vigor, [would] deny the
people those benefits of larger production, lower costs and prices,
and improved standard of living which the Sherman Act was designed to promote.”47 All of these observations expressed the essence of the Chicago School’s emphasis on consumer welfare and
economic rigor—yet they came from a Yale law student in 1951,
who was quoting economists in the Truman Administration.
Another prominent critic of Robinson-Patman was Robert
Pitofsky, who, as an NYU professor, was the staff author of a
widely publicized 1969 ABA report criticizing the FTC’s institutional deficiencies.48 Pitofsky, too, condemned the FTC’s RobinsonPatman enforcement policies for protecting small companies
against larger, more efficient firms and for “equat[ing] injury to a
particular competitor with injury to the competitive process.”49
That approach, he observed, “has been detrimental to the consumer in its tendency to suppress price competition, deter experimentation with new and more efficient methods of distribution,
and erect barriers to entry into new markets by highly competitive, geographically diversified firms.”50 And he thus urged the
FTC to “focus enforcement . . . on instances in which injury to
competition is clear, taking into account the consumer interest in
vigorous price competition.”51
These are positions that today’s populists vilify and associate
with the Chicago School. But like Rowe, Pitofsky was no Chicagoan.
A future FTC Chairman in the Clinton Administration, he explicitly criticized the answers that various Chicago School figures
gave to specific questions of antitrust doctrine.52 As discussed

46 Id at 974 n 290, quoting Council of Economic Advisers, Third Annual Report to the
President 15 (1948), archived at https://perma.cc/LFB8-CX93.
47 Rowe, 60 Yale L J at 974 n 290 (cited in note 5), quoting Hearings Before the Subcommittee on a Study of Monopoly Power of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, 81st Cong, 1st Sess 114 (1949) (statement of John D. Clark, Council of Economic Advisers) (emphasis added). Rowe returned to these themes six years later in a
highly influential critique of the Act. See Rowe, 57 Colum L Rev at 1060 (cited in note 5).
48 See generally Report of the ABA Commission (cited in note 7).
49 Id at 67.
50 Id (emphasis added).
51 Id at 68 (emphasis added).
52 See note 121 and accompanying text.
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below, however, he and his fellow “post-Chicago” scholars still focused on an economic analyses of consumer welfare—precisely
the orientation that the populists reject. They simply disagreed
with individual Chicago scholars about the welfare effects of certain types of conduct, about what rules antitrust should design
for such conduct, and about the institutional competence of courts
and enforcement agencies to promote consumer welfare through
greater antitrust intervention.
Before the mid-1970s, no one could call himself a competent
antitrust lawyer unless he could advise clients on the intricacies
of Robinson-Patman doctrine. Indeed, a nearly two-thirds majority
of the FTC’s nonmerger antitrust agenda consisted of RobinsonPatman cases and investigations—hundreds of them in the 1950s
and 1960s.53
Over the very long term, decades of withering criticism from
Rowe, Pitofsky, Adelman, and others led the government to suspend Robinson-Patman enforcement activities54 and led courts to
find creative ways to limit the Act’s applicability.55 In the near to
medium term, however, the Act had a highly pernicious effect on
antitrust law—not only because it was aggressively enforced in
its own right, but also because its big-is-bad modes of reasoning
infected how enforcers and courts conceptualized antitrust law in
general. For example, Adelman described DOJ’s prosecution of
A&P in the 1940s (discussed below) as a successful “attempt . . .
to infuse the Robinson-Patman Act into the Sherman Act,” along
with all of its “hostility to price competition, the yearning for secure entrepreneurial status, [and] the envy and hate of the small
businessman for big business.”56 Indeed, the district court in
53 See D. Daniel Sokol, Analyzing Robinson-Patman, 83 Geo Wash L Rev 2064, 2071–
73 (2015).
54 See id at 2074–76 (noting that “[b]y the mid-1970s, DOJ unilaterally stopped its
Robinson-Patman enforcement”); United States Department of Justice, Report on the
Robinson-Patman Act 250 (1977). Chicago’s Richard Posner deserves some credit for discouraging aggressive federal enforcement of the Robinson-Patman Act. See Richard A.
Posner, The Robinson-Patman Act: Federal Regulation of Price Differences 52–53 (American Enterprise Institute 1976) (advocating for the repeal of the Act). Still, most of the
credit for suspending such enforcement goes to non-Chicago critics such as Rowe and
Pitofsky and, as discussed below, MIT’s Morris Adelman. Another non-Chicagoan, FTC
Commissioner Philip Elman, was another important Robinson-Patman critic during the
1960s. See also Muris and Nuechterlein, 54 Rev Indust Org at 659 (cited in note 33) (discussing how growing criticism from Rowe, Adelman, Pitofsky, Posner, and Elman led to
the de facto end of federal Robinson-Patman enforcement by the 1980s).
55 See, for example, Volvo Trucks North America, Inc v Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc, 546
US 164, 180–81 (2006).
56 Adelman, A&P at 17 (cited in note 6).
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United States v New York Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co57 (A&P)
expressed “doubt whether we ever needed the Robinson-Patman
law,” given that “the Sherman Act, properly interpreted and administered, would have remedied all the ills meant to be cured.”58
The academic criticism presented by Rowe, Adelman, and
Pitofsky, along with the ensuing demise of Robinson-Patman enforcement, marked critical milestones in reorienting antitrust toward economic rationality. Although largely forgotten, this story
carries important lessons today. The Robinson-Patman objectives
Adelman identified at the root of the A&P prosecution are precisely the objectives that animate today’s populist movement: a
condemnation of bare-knuckle “price competition” and its “envy
and hate” of large companies for upsetting the “secure [ ] status”
of “the small businessman.”59 We do not even have to imagine
what the triumph of populism would mean for twenty-firstcentury antitrust. We need only revisit the twentieth century’s
experience with Robinson-Patman and with the A&P prosecution
to which we now turn: consumers and rationality lost, while inefficiency and intellectual incoherence prevailed.
B. Criticisms of the A&P Prosecution: Adelman and Turner
In the late 1940s, DOJ successfully prosecuted A&P and its
senior executives under the Sherman Act for using the company’s
then-unprecedented scale and scope to disintermediate wholesalers and undersell less efficient grocery stores.60 It argued, in effect, that A&P should be held criminally liable for favoring the
interests of its consumers over those of displaced middlemen and
undersold retail competitors.61 In the words of one prosecutor,
“A&P sells food cheaply [to consumers] in its own stores because
it is a gigantic blood sucker, taking its toll from all levels of the
food industry.”62 The district court endorsed that theme in a
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67 F Supp 626 (ED Ill 1946), affd 173 F2d 79 (7th Cir 1949).
A&P, 67 F Supp at 676.
59 Adelman, A&P at 17 (cited in note 6). Compare Steinbaum, Bernstein, and Strum,
Powerless at 38 (cited in note 2) (criticizing competition policy for holding that “[a]s long
as the consumer came out ahead . . . any negative ramifications for small business . . .
could be tolerated”).
60 See Muris and Nuechterlein, 54 Rev Indust Org at 655–57, 660–63 (cited in note 33).
61 See id at 662 (“Ultimately, the government’s case had nothing to do with any genuine theory of consumer harm and everything to do with protecting companies at all levels
of the grocery business from A&P’s disruptive efficiency.”).
62 Marc Levinson, The Great A&P and the Struggle for Small Business in America
229 (Hill and Wang 2011).
58
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fifty-four-page opinion that was long on “fairness” rhetoric and
sensory metaphors but short on economic analysis and limiting
principles.63 For example, it found that A&P’s business model was
“odorous” and “t[ook] on a polluted colored light,” though only
when “considered as a whole.”64
The reaction of economically trained antitrust scholars was
swift and harsh. Writing in 1949, MIT’s Adelman observed that
DOJ had won the case on the basis of “economic fallacies” that
“should be quickly obvious to any trained and competent economist.”65 DOJ, he added, had “confused the maintenance of competition with the protection of particular competitors. But the two
are usually (though not always) antithetical: no strong competitor, . . . however beneficent his achievements, could avoid affecting adversely other competitors and even putting some of them
out of business.”66 Adelman later noted, in an influential and
highly regarded book on the A&P case, that “the government lawyers, although competent in their profession, were so sadly illiterate in economic facts and economic analysis that they simply
did not realize what they were saying.”67 For example, he observed, neither DOJ’s prosecutors nor the district court articulated any economically coherent basis for distinguishing between
“predatory” price cuts and permissible price competition.68
Beyond that, Adelman explained, it was economically incoherent to predicate any prosecution of a grocery store chain on a
theory of predatory pricing in the first place, given low barriers to
entry in the relevant markets: “No reasonable and prudent A&P
management would have incurred losses to drive out competition
because it would have been impossible to claim the pay-off,” given
that “[e]ntry into the food trade was so cheap and easy that any
attempt to raise prices would immediately have resurrected competition.”69 Adelman thus anticipated by several decades the recoupment analysis that the Supreme Court embraced in its 1993

63 See Muris and Nuechterlein, 54 Rev Indust Org at 660–63 (cited in note 33) (discussing the district court decision). See generally A&P, 67 F Supp 626.
64 A&P, 67 F Supp at 658, 678.
65 Adelman, 63 Q J Econ at 256 (cited in note 8).
66 Id.
67 Adelman, A&P at 16 (cited in note 6).
68 See id at 14–15.
69 Id at 14.
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Brooke Group decision, which today’s populists condemn and
misattribute to the Chicago School.70
The A&P case was also the topic of a 1949 Yale Law Journal
Note written by a young Donald Turner, who had received an economics doctorate from Harvard and was earning his law degree
at Yale while teaching economics there.71 Like Adelman, Turner
explained that the prosecution had made no serious effort to “draw
the line between ‘predatory’ and ‘competitive’ price-cutting,” and
thus its “general broadside against A&P’s reduction of gross profit
rates is a direct attack on the competitive process. . . . Does the
Government or the court feel that business should never risk a loss
for the sake of ultimate gain? If so, a good share of competition
must be consigned to limbo.”72 Likewise, Turner explained, the
court’s attacks on A&P’s strategic use of corporate affiliates “approach saying that vertical integration is illegal per se.”73
In these and other respects, Turner condemned what he saw
as a “serious contradiction” in the prevailing antitrust regime illustrated by the A&P case: a misguided effort toward applying
the Sherman Act to attack the very competitive forces it was
meant to promote.74 He explained:
70 See Brooke Group, 509 US at 225 (“[P]laintiff must demonstrate that there is a
likelihood that the predatory scheme alleged would cause a rise in prices above a competitive level that would be sufficient to compensate for the amounts expended on the predation, including the time value of the money invested in it.”). See also Lina M. Khan, Amazon’s
Antitrust Paradox, 126 Yale L J 710, 727–30 (2017) (arguing that the Chicago School
shaped Supreme Court doctrine on predatory pricing, including the recoupment test announced in Brooke Group).
71 See generally Note, 58 Yale L J 969 (cited in note 9).
72 Id at 977.
73 Id at 978. The Chicago School is often credited (or blamed, in the case of modern
populists) with changing the antitrust perception of vertical restraints and mergers.
Chicago economics was indeed important, although one of the most influential “Chicago
School” articles on vertical restraints was written by a Yale professor who never earned a
Chicago degree. See generally Ward S. Bowman, Tying Arrangements and the Leverage
Problem, 67 Yale L J 19 (1957) (arguing for a reexamination of tying law). See also note
90 (discussing Bowman’s association with the Chicago School). And economists with no
connection to Chicago were also highly influential. These included Nobel Laureate Oliver
Williamson, who persuasively opposed the general hostility toward vertical integration
that had prevailed in mid-century antitrust. See Oliver E. Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications 82–131 (Free Press 1975). Williamson explained that vertical integration is often necessary to reduce transaction costs, including
those involving “post-contractual opportunism,” and his views are now widely accepted in
both law and economics. Id at 104. See also William E. Kovacic, The Intellectual DNA of
Modern U.S. Competition Law for Dominant Firm Conduct: The Chicago/Harvard Double
Helix, 2007 Colum Bus L Rev 1, 14 n 36 (noting that Williamson “is not easily described
as being [ ] a Chicago School . . . commentator”).
74 Note, 58 Yale L J at 970 (cited in note 9).
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The lure of temporary monopoly profits is an important impetus to the introduction of new products and new techniques, which rudely upset the peaceful, profitable existence
of long-entrenched business firms. This constant change to
the new, the more efficient, is the very heart of the process of
effective competition.
...
But in [the A&P case] . . . the defendant corporation represented the forces of competition, efficiency and change. The
potential contradiction in the New Sherman Act is sharply
exposed.”75
The young Turner might just as well have described the prevailing antitrust regime, as Robert Bork did, as a paradox—“a policy
at war with itself.”76 Yet Turner never studied or taught at Chicago
and was no Bork. To the contrary, he went on to lead the Antitrust
Division during the Johnson Administration and co-found the socalled Harvard School of antitrust, which, as discussed below, influenced modern antitrust jurisprudence as much as Chicago
scholars did.77
C. Criticism of 1960s Antitrust Precedents: Handler and
Kauper
While the modern Chicago School was approaching maturity
in the 1960s, the Warren Court was disrupting American antitrust jurisprudence with a series of poorly reasoned decisions that,
in the words of venerable Columbia Professor Milton Handler, “exalted [form] over substance to a degree unparalleled in the history of antitrust” and invoked ever “more hoary rules . . . to the
utter exclusion of a consideration of economic needs and effects.”78
Handler was speaking here of United States v Arnold, Schwinn &
Co,79 an inscrutable 1967 decision on vertical restraints that was
unceremoniously overruled ten years later.80 Incoherent though it
75

Id at 969–71.
Bork, The Antitrust Paradox at 7 (cited in note 11).
77 See Kovacic, 2007 Colum Bus L Rev at 33–43 (cited in note 73).
78 Milton Handler, The Twentieth Annual Antitrust Review—1967, 53 Va L Rev 1667,
1684, 1686 (1967).
79 388 US 365 (1967), overruled by Continental T.V., Inc v GTE Sylvania Inc, 433 US
36 (1977).
80
See Schwinn, 388 US at 379 (announcing the per se rule); Continental T.V., 433
US at 58. See also Earl E. Pollock, Alternative Distribution Methods After Schwinn, 63 Nw
U L Rev 595, 595 (1968) (“[T]he teaching of Schwinn is that in antitrust cases form is more
important than substance.”).
76
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was, Schwinn had several strong rivals for “worst antitrust decision of the 1960s,” and another candidate that drew Handler’s
criticism was Utah Pie Co v Continental Baking Co,81 also decided
in 1967.82
The defendants in that case were several national frozen pie
companies that had selectively lowered their prices in Salt Lake
City to compete more effectively against plaintiff Utah Pie, a local
company that controlled nearly two-thirds of the Salt Lake City
pie market.83 None of these defendants plausibly hoped to gain
more than a minority share of the relevant market; still less could
any of them expect to drive all other competitors from that market
and then raise its own prices to monopoly levels. Indeed, Utah Pie
retained more than 45 percent of that market despite years of
competition from national corporations.84 The Supreme Court
nonetheless upheld jury verdicts against the national pie companies because it was troubled that they had selectively lowered
prices in Utah and not elsewhere.85 That tactic, the Court believed, was unduly hard on the local incumbent, which was family
operated and had “only 18 employees.”86 The Court held that antitrust should protect such small companies, even those with high
local market shares, from “the financial pinch” they feel when selective price-cutting by larger competitors forces them to “reduce
[their] price[s] to a new all-time low in a market of declining
prices.”87
No one needed to wait for a Chicago scholar to identify the
problem with this logic. Handler remarked:
Isn’t the ultimate goal of antitrust a competitive economy with
lower consumer prices? Of course, if a seller lowers prices and
then raises them to higher levels after driving his competitors
out of business, a classic antitrust violation has occurred. The
[Utah Pie] opinion’s implication that discrimination leading
to a general price decline may, alone, suffice to spell illegality
is troublesome.88

81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88

386 US 685 (1967).
See Handler, 53 Va L Rev at 1692–98 (cited in note 78).
Utah Pie, 386 US at 689–91.
Id at 689.
Id at 694–701.
Id at 689.
Utah Pie, 386 US at 700.
Handler, 53 Va L Rev at 1697 (cited in note 78) (emphasis added).
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In this single passage, Handler both (1) encapsulated the consumerwelfare approach that today’s populists identify with the Chicago
School and (2) like Adelman, endorsed the “recoupment” standard
later adopted in Brooke Group and also vilified by the populists
as a creature of the Chicago School.89 But also like Adelman,
Turner, and Pitofsky, Handler was no Chicagoan; he was a Columbia professor who had earned his LLM at Columbia in 1926.
Justice Potter Stewart was no Chicagoan either, yet he made
much the same point in his Utah Pie dissent:
[T]he Court has fallen into the error of . . . protecting competitors, instead of competition. . . . [The] cases [on which defendants relied] are said [by the majority] to be inapposite
because they involved “no general decline in price structure,”
and no “lasting impact upon prices.” But lower prices are the
hallmark of intensified competition.90
Michigan Professor Thomas Kauper, who later served as DOJ
antitrust chief under Presidents Nixon and Ford, likewise criticized 1960s-era antitrust in a 1968 article entitled The “Warren
Court” and the Antitrust Laws: Of Economics, Populism, and Cynicism.91 Kauper observed that the Court’s antitrust decisions “often seemed less concerned with the economically necessary level
of rivalry within the market than with what may be described as
the ‘rights’ of the individual firms which comprise the market”

89 The Brooke Group Court dismissed Utah Pie as an “early judicial inquiry” and
effectively overruled it. Brooke Group, 509 US at 221.
90 386 US at 705–06 (Stewart dissenting) (emphasis added). Yale Professor Ward
Bowman likewise observed that Utah Pie exemplified the Court’s “disregard for the central
purpose of antitrust, the promotion of consumer welfare through the promotion of a competitive market process.” Ward S. Bowman, Restraint of Trade by the Supreme Court: The
Utah Pie Case, 77 Yale L J 70, 70 (1967). A decade earlier, Bowman had also been instrumental in using economic analysis to challenge the widespread assumption that tying arrangements were inherently problematic. See Bowman, 67 Yale L J at 33–34 (cited in note
73). Although Bowman spent his career teaching at Yale and appears never to have earned
a Chicago degree, he is often associated with “the Chicago School,” apparently because he
worked as a research associate at Chicago in the mid-1950s and had fruitful discussions
there with Aaron Director and John McGee. See id at 19 n †. See also Richard Epstein,
Bork’s Bowman: “Not Gone, but Forgotten,” 79 Antitrust L J 903, 904 (2014). In fact, Bowman
can equally well be characterized as yet another non-Chicagoan who embraced the consumer
welfare standard and who strongly influenced younger scholars later associated with the
Chicago School—particularly Robert Bork, whom Bowman recruited to Yale. See id at 916
(“[A]nyone who looks closely at the earlier Bowman writings will see in an instant how
much The Antitrust Paradox is dependent on the earlier work by Bowman to which Bork,
of course, gave ample credit.”).
91 See generally Thomas E. Kauper, The “Warren Court” and the Antitrust Laws: Of
Economics, Populism, and Cynicism, 67 Mich L Rev 325 (1968).
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and that each firm’s “independence and right to be treated as
other firms are treated have become values to be protected as
ends in themselves.”92 He expressed concern that if those ends are
“achieved at the cost of economic efficiency, the price may be too
great.”93 The same criticisms could equally well be directed at today’s populists.
D. The “Harvard School”: Areeda, Turner, and Breyer
Professor William Kovacic has cogently observed that today’s
attacks on the Chicago School almost invariably ignore the equal
if not greater influence of the Harvard School—Areeda, Turner,
Breyer, and others—on the development of modern antitrust law.
As he notes, these scholars, “more than any other commentators,
catalyzed the retrenchment of liability standards and motivated
a more general and fundamental reassessment of US doctrine
governing dominant firms.”94
For example, Areeda and Turner’s landmark 1975 article on
predatory pricing—building on Turner’s insights from his 1949
student Note—helped delimit for generations of antitrust courts
and practitioners the narrow economic circumstances in which
price cuts could harm consumers and thus should be prohibited.95
The article not only set forth economically rigorous accounts of
“cost” for determining when a price can be said to fall “below cost,”
but also reaffirmed the observations of Adelman and others that
“predation in any meaningful sense cannot exist” without a serious risk of recoupment—that is, without “a very substantial prospect that the losses [the defendant] incurs in the predatory campaign will be exceeded by the profits to be earned after [its] rivals
have been destroyed.”96 Few law review articles have shaped legal
doctrine as decisively as this one did. For example, it strongly influenced the First Circuit’s Barry Wright Corp v ITT Grinnell
Corp97 decision in 198398—authored by then-Judge Stephen
92

Id at 333.
Id at 334.
94 Kovacic, 2007 Colum Bus L Rev at 7 (cited in note 73). See also generally William
E. Kovacic, The Chicago Obsession in the Interpretation of US Antitrust History, 87 U Chi
L Rev 459 (2020).
95 Areeda and Turner, 88 Harv L Rev at 699–700 (cited in note 14). See also Kovacic,
2007 Colum Bus L Rev at 7 (cited in note 73).
96 Areeda and Turner, 88 Harv L Rev at 698 (cited in note 14).
97 724 F2d 227 (1st Cir 1983).
98 See id at 231–32 (“[T]here is general agreement that a profit-maximizing firm
might . . . engage in predatory pricing . . . if it knows (1) that it can cut prices deeply
93
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Breyer—and ultimately the Supreme Court’s decision in Brooke
Group a decade later.99 More generally, no serious account of US
antitrust law can ignore the enormous influence of the definitive
antitrust treatise that Areeda and Turner first issued in 1978,
which now, in its fourth edition, is authored by Professor Herbert
Hovenkamp.100
Breyer himself was an antitrust professor at Harvard when
he was appointed to the First Circuit in 1980, and his subsequent
judicial role presents something of an embarrassment to antitrust’s populist critics. Under the usual populist narrative, “a
small crew within the Reagan administration” reshaped antitrust
by installing Bork and other Chicago School conservatives in the
federal judiciary.101 But a review of judicial decisions tells a more
interesting story. Kovacic writes that in the late 1980s and early
1990s he “read all of the antitrust decisions of the federal courts
of appeals in which judges appointed by Presidents Jimmy
Carter, Ronald Reagan, or George H.W. Bush participated . . . to
assess whether the Reagan and Bush appointees voted more ‘conservatively’ than Carter appointees in antitrust cases.”102 Although
Republican appointees did generally vote more conservatively
than Democratic ones,
no judge voted more consistently for defendants or authored
opinions with greater impact in narrowing the zone of antitrust liability than Stephen Breyer, a Carter appointee and
former colleague of Areeda and Turner at Harvard. As a court
of appeals judge, Justice Breyer was instrumental in setting

enough to outlast and to drive away all competitors, and (2) that it can then raise prices
high enough to recoup lost profits.”), citing Areeda and Turner 88, Harv L Rev at 698–99
(cited in note 14). See also Kovacic, 2007 Colum Bus L Rev at 48–49 (cited in note 73)
(discussing Areeda and Turner’s influence on Barry Wright).
99 Brooke Group, 509 US at 224, citing Areeda and Turner, 88 Harv L Rev at 708–09
(cited in note 14). See also Kovacic, 2007 Colum Bus L Rev at 46 n 139 (cited in note 73)
(noting the article’s influence on Brooke Group, and adding that Areeda and Turner were
the most cited scholars in the opinion).
100 See generally Phillip Areeda and Donald F. Turner, 1–3 Antitrust Law: An Analysis
of Antitrust Principles and Their Application (Little, Brown 1978). See also generally Herbert
Hovenkamp, The Areeda-Turner Treatise in Antitrust Analysis, 41 Antitrust Bull 815
(1996); Hillary Greene and D. Daniel Sokol, Judicial Treatment of the Antitrust Treatise,
100 Iowa L Rev 2039 (2015).
101 Lynn, No Free Parking for Monopoly Players (cited in note 1). See also Steinbaum,
Bernstein, and Strum, Powerless at 17 (cited in note 2).
102 Kovacic, 2007 Colum Bus L Rev at 7–8 (cited in note 73).
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doctrinal trends often ascribed to the influence of the Chicago
School.103
Breyer’s role in this story is instructive in several respects.
First, he is yet another major figure whom no one would associate
with the Chicago School but who has been no less committed than
card-carrying Chicagoans to the centrality of consumer welfare
and rigorous economics in antitrust analysis. Second, current
populist condemnation of antitrust doctrine virtually never mentions him, presumably because it is politically more expedient for
many populists to demonize a conservative such as Bork than a
liberal such as Breyer. Third, Breyer’s jurisprudence reminds us
that antitrust defies easy partisan labels. Rigorous analysis can
lead “liberal” judges such as Breyer to oppose antitrust intervention in close cases. So too can it lead conservatives to support antitrust intervention in ways that surprise nonlawyer pundits, as
when DOJ antitrust chief and Chicago Professor Bill Baxter successfully pursued the breakup of AT&T in the early Reagan Administration104 and when law-and-economics Reagan appointees
such as Judges Douglas Ginsburg and Stephen Williams voted to
find Microsoft liable for monopolization offenses in 2001.105 By the
same token, antitrust populism also transcends party lines, as
President Donald J. Trump’s antitrust rhetoric often illustrates.106

103 Id at 8. See also id at 8 n 23 (citing scholarship analyzing Justice Breyer’s antitrust
jurisprudence). Kovacic cites Barry Wright and Town of Concord v Boston Edison Co, 915
F2d 17 (1st Cir 1990), as particularly influential Breyer decisions as a court of appeals
judge. Kovacic, 2007 Colum Bus L Rev at 8 (cited in note 73). On the Supreme Court,
Justice Breyer has often voted with the Court’s “conservatives” in antitrust cases and
sometimes against them, but he has remained a stalwart champion of consumer welfare
as the fundamental objective of antitrust. See id at 68–69 (describing the Court’s majority
opinion in Verizon Communications Inc v Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 US 398
(2003) as “unmistakably [ ] the product of a Scalia-Breyer [ ] collaboration”).
104 See United States v American Telephone and Telegraph Co, 552 F Supp 131, 170
(DDC 1982), affd Maryland v United States, 460 US 1001 (1983); Jonathan E. Nuechterlein
and Philip J. Weiser, Digital Crossroads: Telecommunications Law and Policy in the Internet Age 16–17, 42–48 (MIT 2d ed 2013) (discussing “Baxter’s Law”).
105 See United States v Microsoft Corp, 253 F3d 34, 44, 51 (DC Cir 2001) (en banc).
106 See John Micklethwait, Margaret Talev, and Jennifer Jacobs, Trump Says Google,
Facebook, Amazon May Be “Antitrust Situation” (Bloomberg, Aug 30, 2018), online at
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-08-30/google-under-fire-again-on-search
-as-hatch-calls-for-ftc-probe (visited Jan 26, 2020) (Perma archive unavailable); Brian
Stelter, Donald Trump Rips into Possible AT&T-Time Warner Deal (CNN Business, Oct
22, 2016), archived at https://perma.cc/35CH-UNM6 (quoting candidate Trump: “As an
example of the power structure I’m fighting, AT&T is buying Time Warner and thus CNN,
a deal we will not approve in my administration”); note 112 and accompanying text (discussing Trump’s positions on the Sinclair-Tribune and Comcast-NBCUniversal mergers);
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III. THE OBVIOUSNESS OF PUTTING CONSUMERS FIRST
This Essay has focused on the many influential non-Chicagoans from the 1940s to the present who embraced the same foundational principles associated with the Chicago School today: that
consumer welfare is antitrust’s ultimate objective and that economics is critical to meeting it. Why did all of these scholars in
and out of Chicago gravitate toward those same principles? One
explanation is sheer coincidence: these intellectually rigorous
scholars happened to favor what became regarded as the Chicago
School approach to antitrust, but there are alternative, equally
workable approaches to antitrust they could have chosen. The
other explanation is that America’s long history of experimentation with alternative approaches—as exemplified by RobinsonPatman enforcement, the A&P prosecution, and the Supreme
Court’s 1960s-era precedent—confirms that the alternatives are
not workable in the first place because they have no coherent
means of resolving competing policy objectives.
The latter explanation is far more persuasive. Antitrust
takes the form it does today because we have learned from hard
experience that an economically rigorous focus on consumer welfare is essential to coherent antitrust policy. As Bruce Hoffman, until recently Director of the FTC’s Bureau of Competition, observed:
[T]he consumer welfare standard that is currently the touchstone for antitrust enforcement in the United States . . . is the
result of decades of experience in the United States with failed
standards, such as protecting competitors at the expense of
consumers. This prolonged experiment is somewhat unique to
[the] United States, largely because we’ve had antitrust laws
on the books and actively enforced them for so long that we’ve
had lots of opportunities to get our approach wrong—opportunities that we have often taken. But having made those mistakes, we want to make sure we don’t repeat them.107
To see this point—the “obviousness” of making consumer welfare the fundamental goal of antitrust—consider the available

Daniel Kishi, Time for a Conservative Anti-Monopoly Movement (The American Conservative, Sept 19, 2017), archived at https://perma.cc/2FDJ-N8DK; Robert Verbruggen, Google,
Facebook, Amazon: Our Digital Overlords (National Review, Dec 12, 2017), archived at
https://perma.cc/LJG6-8GC4.
107 Remarks of D. Bruce Hoffman, Competition Policy and the Tech Industry—What’s
at Stake? *2 (CCIA, Apr 12, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/FVN7-JRWL.
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alternatives. Those alternatives do not include a regime that excludes consumer welfare altogether; essentially everyone agrees
that consumer interests must play some role in antitrust analysis.
For example, to our knowledge, even hard-core populists do not
argue that every large company should be held liable whenever it
offers discounts, free shipping, or other consumer-friendly terms
that smaller companies cannot match and that may thus drive
some of them from the market. In Barry Lynn’s terms, this means
that the “opportunity of the citizen producer” must sometimes
yield to “the welfare of the consumer.” 108
But when, and by what formula? The problem is not simply
one of creating two fundamental objectives for antitrust when before there was only one. As Professor Adelman observed in 1949,
the deeper problem is that these particular objectives—“the
maintenance of competition [and] the protection of particular
competitors”—are typically “antithetical: no strong competitor,
. . . however beneficent his achievements, could avoid affecting
adversely other competitors and even putting some of them out of
business.”109 Antitrust populists never articulate how courts
should “weigh” these two antithetical goals. Nor do populists explain how a corporate executive, contemplating an innovative
competitive strategy, could possibly predict how a court will rule
108 Lynn, No Free Parking for Monopoly Players (cited in note 1) (quotation marks
omitted).
109 Adelman, 63 Q J Econ at 256 (cited in note 8). A similar problem arose in the
merger context after the Supreme Court issued the following schizoid holding in Brown
Shoe Co, Inc v United States, 370 US 294, 344 (1962):

[S]ome of the results of large integrated . . . operations are beneficial to consumers. Their expansion is not rendered unlawful by the mere fact that small independent stores may be adversely affected. It is competition, not competitors,
which the Act protects. But we cannot fail to recognize Congress’ desire to promote competition through the protection of viable, small, locally owned businesses. Congress appreciated that occasional higher costs and prices might result from the maintenance of fragmented industries and markets. It resolved
these competing considerations in favor of decentralization.
The contradiction is palpable: “No matter how many times you read it, that passage states:
Although mergers are not rendered unlawful by the mere fact that small independent
stores may be adversely affected, we must recognize that mergers are unlawful when small
independent stores may be adversely affected.” Robert H. Bork and Ward S. Bowman, The
Crisis in Antitrust, 65 Colum L Rev 363, 373 (1965). The Supreme Court later resolved the
contradiction sub silentio by embracing, without qualification, the supervening proposition
that “[t]he antitrust laws . . . were enacted for the ‘protection of competition, not competitors.’” Brunswick Corp v Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc, 429 US 477, 488 (1977), quoting Brown
Shoe, 370 US at 320. Kovacic persuasively attributes that holding, authored by Justice
Thurgood Marshall for a unanimous Court, to Areeda and the Harvard School rather than
the Chicago School. Kovacic, 2007 Colum Bus L Rev at 55–61 (cited in note 73).
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when aggrieved competitors argue that the strategy offers consumers not only a good bargain, but too good a bargain. That executive would almost certainly pull competitive punches lest she
guess wrong and expose her company to antitrust liability. The
ultimate victims of such chilled competition and innovation would
be consumers and the economy as a whole.110
The problem would become even worse if we started adding
further objectives into the mix. For example, Professor Tim Wu
proposes that antitrust enforcement decisions should turn in part
on whether “the complained-of conduct or merger tend[s] to implicate important non-economic values, particularly political values”; for example, “Might it tend to preserve a long-standing, politically influential oligopoly?”111 No creativity is needed to
imagine the parade of horribles that would follow from this idea;
the White House has already supplied it. President Trump
tweeted in 2018 that it was “So sad and unfair” that “the Sinclair
Broadcast merger with Tribune” was blocked because it “would
have been a great and much needed Conservative voice for and of
the People,” whereas it was “Disgraceful” that “Liberal Fake
News NBC and Comcast gets approved.”112 Presumably Wu does
not wish to legitimate threats to use antitrust as a means of suppressing “liberal Fake News” and elevate “much needed Conservative voice[s]”—but that is what his proposal does.
Challenges to the consumer welfare standard might be more
understandable if, as its critics sometimes contend, it focused myopically on “short-term effects on price and output” and ignored
other values important to consumers, such as “product quality,

110 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy and Inequality of Wealth, CPI Antitrust
Chron 1, 5 (Oct 2017)

Should antitrust condemn every practice that reduces the defendant’s prices or
costs, or improves the quality of its product when rivals are injured or suppliers
are worse off? That policy would rather quickly drive the economy back into the
Stone Age, imposing hysterical costs on everyone. To be sure, there might be
ways of limiting the rule. For example, we might say that lower prices or higher
quality ought to be condemned only when it creates or threatens to create a monopoly. That approach might not be quite as bad, but it would be a strong barrier
to innovation, and particularly to market shifting innovations that result in dominant firms. There would go Ford, Bell, IBM, Kodak, Polaroid, Xerox, Microsoft,
Google, Apple and numerous others.
111 Tim Wu, After Consumer Welfare, Now What? The “Protection of Competition”
Standard in Practice, CPI Antitrust Chron 1, 9 (Apr 2018).
112 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump) (Twitter, July 24, 2018), archived at
http://perma.cc/VMP5-BQP8. See also note 106 (noting some of Trump’s other antitrust
positions).
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variety, and innovation.”113 But in fact the consumer welfare
standard is not so myopic, and populists claiming otherwise are
attacking a straw man. Properly applied, the consumer welfare
standard analyzes both short-term and long-term price effects
and views “price” and “quality” as two sides of the same coin—
“quality-adjusted prices.”114 The consumer welfare standard also
takes due account of “variety” and “innovation”; indeed, the 2010
Horizontal Merger Guidelines include an entire subsection entitled “Innovation and Product Variety.”115 And despite criticisms
based on a literalistic misunderstanding of the term, the “consumer welfare standard” prevents inefficient allocation of social
resources by shielding suppliers against market-power abuses by
purchasers, which can inefficiently suppress output.116
None of this is to say that the “consumer welfare standard”
prescribes a simple and determinate mode of analysis or that it is
always straightforward in application. Scholars and practitioners
can adhere to that standard but disagree vigorously about what
types of conduct threaten consumer welfare over the long term,

113 Khan, 126 Yale L J at 716, 737 (cited in note 70). See also Marshall Steinbaum
and Maurice E. Stucke, The Effective Competition Standard: A New Standard for Antitrust, 87 U Chi L Rev 595, 610 (2020) (proposing an amendment to the Clayton Act to
require consideration of a merger’s effects “[n]ot only on prices, but other parameters of
competition, including quality, choice, innovation, and privacy”).
114 See Joshua D. Wright and Douglas H. Ginsburg, The Goals of Antitrust: Welfare
Trumps Choice, 81 Fordham L Rev 2405, 2410 & nn 29–31 (2013).
115 United States Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Horizontal
Merger Guidelines § 6.4 (Aug 19, 2010).
116 See, for example, Complaint, United States v Danone S.A., No 1:17-cv-00592, *28
(DDC filed Apr 3, 2017) (challenging a merger between dairy-product manufacturers that,
without conditions, would “result [in] a likely lessening of competition in the purchase of
raw organic milk from farmers”); Competitive Impact Statement, United States v Lucasfilm
Ltd, No 1:10-cv-02220, *2–3 (DDC filed Dec 21, 2010) (addressing a “no poach” agreement
among competitors concerning highly skilled employees). “If [consumer welfare] is understood as total welfare or trading partner welfare, it encompasses buy-side or monopsony
issues to the same extent as sell-side or monopoly issues.” A. Douglas Melamed and Nicolas Petit, The Misguided Assault on the Consumer Welfare Standard in the Age of Platform
Markets, 54 Rev Indust Org 741, 753 (2019). Commentators disagree about whether “consumer welfare” (narrowly construed) or “total welfare” (including buy-side harms that may
not affect ultimate consumers) is technically the more appropriate formulation of antitrust’s ultimate objectives, but that distinction has very limited significance in real-world
practice. See Thomas O. Barnett, Substantial Lessening of Competition—The Section 7
Standard, 2005 Colum Bus L Rev 293, 297 (stating that divergence between consumer
welfare and total welfare standards is “rare [ ] in practice”); J. Thomas Rosch, Monopsony
and the Meaning of “Consumer Welfare”: A Closer Look at Weyerhaeuser, 2007 Colum Bus
L Rev 353, 354–55 (citing scholarship).
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what “long term” means for those purposes, when market concentration is and is not a problem for consumer welfare,117 how the
risks of false positives should be weighed against the risks of false
negatives,118 the appropriate mix of bright-line and nuanced
rules,119 and the competence of generalist courts and antitrust
agencies in formulating and applying such rules.120
Consider the essays that former FTC Chairman Pitofsky collected in the widely cited 2008 book entitled How the Chicago
School Overshot the Mark. The “post-Chicago” scholars featured
in this collection acknowledge the primacy of consumer welfare
and the singular importance of economic analysis in promoting
it.121 Although many of these scholars advocate moving antitrust
doctrine in a pro-enforcement direction, they acknowledge the
need to support those proposals with valid economics.
For example, Professor Steven Salop has used sophisticated
economic models to argue that certain conduct, by “raising rivals’
costs,” can harm consumer welfare even though it would survive
scrutiny both under existing doctrine (such as the Brooke Group
standard) and under the rules favored by specific Chicago School

117 Populists often cite various statistics as basis for contending that “[c]onsolidation
and concentration are on the rise in sector after sector” and that “today, in America, competition is dying.” Elizabeth Warren, “Reigniting Competition in the American Economy”:
Keynote Remarks at New America’s Open Markets Program Event *1 (June 29, 2016), archived at https://perma.cc/ZV8S-8B3D. See also Council of Economic Advisors, Benefits of
Competition and Indicators of Market Power *4 (Apr 2016), archived at
https://perma.cc/CC9P-ZGCY. For incisive critiques of this position, which ignores the role
of scale economies in the modern economy and basic principles of market definition, see
Carl Shapiro, Antitrust in a Time of Populism, 61 Intl J Indust Org 714, 742 (2018);
Gregory J. Werden and Luke M. Froeb, Don’t Panic: A Guide to Claims of Increasing Concentration, 33 Antitrust 74, 76–78 (2018).
118 Compare Jonathan B. Baker, Taking the Error Out of “Error Cost” Analysis:
What’s Wrong with Antitrust’s Right, 80 Antitrust L J 1, 2 (2015) (“[The] assumptions [of
today’s antitrust conservatives] systematically overstate the incidence and significance of
false positives, understate the incidence and significance of false negatives, and understate
the net benefits of various rules by overstating their costs.”), with Frank H. Easterbrook,
The Limits of Antitrust, 63 Tex L Rev 1, 2 (1984) (“If the court errs by condemning a beneficial practice, the benefits may be lost for good. . . . If the court errs by permitting a
deleterious practice, though, the welfare loss decreases over time.”).
119 See note 122 and accompanying text (addressing Salop’s rule-of-reason approach
for raising-rivals’-costs claims).
120 See Kovacic, 2007 Colum Bus L Rev at 73–74 (cited in note 73) (addressing interplay between Chicago School and Harvard School regarding “concerns about institutional
design and capacity”).
121 See Robert Pitofsky, Introduction: Setting the Stage, in Robert Pitofsky, ed, How
the Chicago School Overshot the Mark: The Effect of Conservative Economic Analysis on
U.S. Antitrust 3, 5–6 (Oxford 2008).
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figures such as Bork and Posner.122 Yet Salop challenges those
doctrinal choices only because, in his view, they inadequately account for real-world economic scenarios and thus disserve consumer welfare. As he concludes, those choices “do not hold up to
careful economic analysis,” and “the better legal standard would
be the rule of reason with its focus on consumer harm.”123 Again,
that is precisely the consumer welfare focus rejected by today’s populists. And it marks a logical evolution of, not a conceptual break
from, the broader insights of the Chicago School itself. Indeed,
although they used different terminology, Professors Director and
Levi foreshadowed Salop’s scholarship in 1956 by identifying raising rivals’ costs as a potential basis for antitrust liability.124
In short, so-called post-Chicago scholarship has far more in
common with traditional Chicago School scholarship than with
present-day populism, with its proposals for radical antitrust intervention unhinged from any economic analysis of the effects on
consumer welfare. This point supplies a needed antidote to populist rhetoric. The true divide in antitrust thought today is not between “liberals” and “conservatives,” and not between Chicago
and post-Chicago theory. It is instead between those who favor
and those who disfavor a rational, economics-based approach to
competition policy in America.

122 See Steven C. Salop, Economic Analysis of Exclusionary Vertical Conduct: Where
Chicago Has Overshot the Mark, in Pitofsky, ed, How the Chicago School Overshot the
Mark, 141, 142–44 (cited in note 121); Steven C. Salop, The Raising Rivals’ Cost Foreclosure Paradigm, Conditional Pricing Practices, and the Flawed Incremental Price-Cost
Test, 81 Antitrust L J 371, 373 (2017); Krattenmaker and Salop, 96 Yale L J at 214 (cited
in note 15).
123 Salop, Economic Analysis at 155 (cited in note 122). Like Salop, post-Chicago
scholar Professor Carl Shapiro, a leading antitrust economist in the Obama and Clinton
administrations, remains a champion of the consumer welfare standard, urging policymakers to reject the “‘big is bad’ mentality” associated with contemporary populism because “[w]e learned long ago that proper antitrust enforcement is about protecting consumers, and protecting the competitive process, not about protecting competitors. We must
not forget that guiding principle.” Shapiro, 61 Intl J Indust Org at 742 (cited in note 117).
124 See Kobayashi and Muris, 78 Antitrust L J at 161–62 (cited in note 20), discussing
Aaron Director and Edward H. Levi, Law and the Future: Trade Regulation, 51 Nw U L
Rev 281, 293 (1956).

